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If you believe, as I do, that statutes are changes in the corpus juris intended by the legislature. If you                                       
believe, as I do, that interpreting statutes must be a search for the legislature’s intended meaning of the                                   
statutes’ texts. And if you believe, as I do, that the second proposition above follows from the first – given                                       
the assumptions that the legislature has the authority to change the corpus juris, and that its authority is                                   
superior to the authority of interpreters – then you, like me, will be delighted with Richard Ekins’s The Nature                                     
of Legislative Intent. For Ekins makes a brilliant case in support of intentionalism in statutory interpretation. 
Ekins’s book is a veritable treasure trove of points about legislatures, legislating, and language. He                             
argues that the legislature’s basic function is to enact changes in the body of laws that promote the common                                     
good.1 He has interesting points to make about the well­known obstacles to fulfilling that function: the                               
‘discursive dilemma,’ where the reasons endorsed by a majority of legislators do not match the proposal                               
endorsed by the majority,2 and Arrow’s theorem, which proves the impossibility of guaranteeing a stable set                               
of majority­preferred policies.3 
My favorite chapters are four (‘Legislating Without Reasoning’) and seven (‘Language Use and                         
Intention’). Ekins’s basic point is to reject ‘mindless’ legislation. Mindless legislation is inconsistent with the                             
function of the legislature, which is to enact reasoned changes in the laws. But treating statutes as if the                                     
legislature had only the ‘thin’ intention to adopt a particular text and disregarding the legislature’s intended                               
meaning of that text is both to misunderstand language use and to render legislation a mindless rather than                                   
reasoned process.4 Ekins attacks the positions of Waldron, Raz, Marmor, and Schauer, all of whom seem to                                 


























Take the prosaic example of a father telling the children, ‘I want you in bed by 9 o’clock.’ At 9:15 he                                         
finds the children in the living room watching television. When he reminds them of his instruction, they reply                                   
truthfully that they were in bed by 9 but then got out of bed at 9:05. If one takes the semantic autonomy                                           
position, the children are on solid ground. But, of course, they have disobeyed the father and done so                                   
knowingly. 
Ekins, following linguistic philosophers Neale,7 Soames,8 and Bach,9 asserts the ‘undetermination                     
thesis’: The semantic content of a sentence is not capable of settling what a speaker means in uttering the                                     
sentence.10 Not only are natural languages replete with ambiguities, but the meaning of sentences                           
employing even unambiguous language will be opaque in the absence of reference to the utterer’s intent.                               
The examples of this are legion. To take only a few of the many Ekins employs, consider the statements ‘I                                       
have two children’ and ‘I have two beers in the fridge.’11 Normally, we infer that the speaker of the first                                       
sentence has exactly two children, whereas the speaker of the second has at least two beers. But the                                   
sentences would be literally true if the first speaker had six children and the second exactly two beers. Or                                     
















Ekins has many other examples demonstrating the impossibility of semantic autonomy and the                         
necessity in understanding language use to seek out the Gricean speaker’s intended meaning, the meaning                             
the speaker intends as the uptake of his audience.14 The key chapter on this point, Chapter Seven, is alone                                     
worth the price of the book. 
But, of course, if the legislature’s intended meaning is the proper quarry for statutory interpretation, as                               
Ekins and I both contend, then a familiar problem looms. Legislatures are comprised of multiple legislators.                               
They are groups. And there are no group minds. Therefore, while we can easily refer to the intentions of                                     
legislators, how can the legislature itself have intentions? 
One approach, which I and others have suggested in the past, is to aggregate the intentions of the                                   
individual legislators. If enough legislators – perhaps a number sufficient to enact a statute – share the same                                   
intended meaning, then that meaning is the meaning of the statute. If, however, a majority votes in favor of                                     
the statute, but there is no shared intended meaning among enough legislators voting ‘aye’ to make a                                 
majority, what are we to say is the statute’s intended meaning? If we have recourse to some mechanical rule                                     
selected to handle such situations, the statute will be the product of a mindless process rather than a                                   
product of reasoned deliberation about the public good. Alternatively, we could say that the statute has no                                 
meaning. It is gibberish, an inkblot, and has no legal effect. In my opinion, the latter outcome is preferable to                                       
the former; no legal change is better than mindless legal change. But neither outcome is a happy one. 
Ekins, however, wants to avoid both outcomes. He does so by rejecting the premise that led to them,                                   
namely, that legislative intent must be the aggregate of individual legislators’ intents.15 Instead, he argues                             
that legislative intent is the product of the interlocking intentions of the legislators.16 What he means by this                                   
seems to be captured by this account of legislators’ intentions when they vote to enact a law: 




All this is true, but does it solve the problem? I cannot see how it does. For what is ‘this proposal’ that                                           
we are enacting? If legislator 1 means by ‘this proposal’ do X, and legislator 2 means by ‘this proposal’ do Y,                                         

















and C against, the proposal becomes law. A, in voting, intended that we, the city council, enact the proposal                                     
to ban rallies by the river bank. B, in voting, intended that we, the city council, enact the proposal to ban                                         
rallies by the financial bank. What proposal did we enact? 
Of course, the ambiguity could and should have been resolved before the vote, in which case it is                                   
possible no proposal would have been enacted. But that did not happen, and now City’s code contains a                                   
ban on ‘rallies by the bank.’ So it seems fair to ask, if that ban is not gibberish, what is its intended meaning? 
Or consider a case of latent ambiguity. The city council has received complaints about dogs brought                               
into restaurants disturbing other patrons. A proposes an ordinance banning dogs in restaurants. A intends                             
by this to ban all dogs, including service dogs, and he would oppose it were it to exempt service dogs. (He                                         
believes companion dogs are just as important to people as service dogs.) B, on the other hand, believes                                   
that the proposed ban surely excludes service dogs. He would vote against it if it did not. And C, a                                       
libertarian, opposes any ban and believes the restaurants can decide for themselves whether and which                             
dogs to allow. The ban passes two (A and B) to one (C). But ‘the proposal’ A intended that we enact is                                           
different from ‘the proposal’ B intended that we enact. And neither proposal was favored by a majority. So                                   
what is the legislative intent with respect to the ban on dogs in restaurants? 
Ekins’s model of a legislature is the House of Commons, and he details its elaborate procedures for                                 
enacting statutes.18 Those procedures would most of the time eliminate the kinds of misunderstandings that                             
plague my hypothetical city council. So when MPs vote and thereby intend that we, the House of Commons,                                   
enact this proposal, it is quite likely in most cases that everyone has the same proposal in mind. 
But bear in mind ‘the proposal’ is not an autonomous text, the meaning of which is mindlessly                                 
constituted by linguistic conventions. ‘The proposal’ is the intended meaning of the text. So it is crucial that                                   
when we as a legislature enact a proposal, there is a single intended meaning of the proposal. Otherwise, it                                     
would be not a single proposal but a multitude of proposals cloaked by a single text. The elaborate                                   
procedures of the House of Commons cannot guarantee a single intended meaning; at best, they can make                                 
a single intended meaning highly likely. In the U.S., bicameralism and the requirement of executive assent                               
reduce that likelihood.19 And for legislatures such as city councils, which lack the elaborate procedures of                               
Parliament or Congress, the likelihood of single intended meaning behind enactments is even less likely. 
In the end, even if Ekins is correct that legislatures can have intentions and has given a good account                                     
of what that entails, I do not think he has allayed the worries of those like me who believe that ultimately one                                           
must seek congruence among individual legislators’ intended meanings. For if Ekins is correct – and I                               
believe he is – that we must interpret statutes the way we generally interpret rational language use by                                   
speakers, then we are left with the task of seeking a single intended meaning that may not exist. And that                                       
will leave us with the unhappy choice between statutes as mindless changes in the law and statutes as                                   
gibberish. And as I said, put to that unhappy choice, I would reluctantly choose gibberish. 
                                                                                                                           18 See ibid 161­79. 19 Should we 
expect that even if all 100 senators have the same understanding of the complex proposals they vote on, all 435 
members of the House will have the same understanding of it, and that their understanding will be the same as the 
senators’? And will the President also understand the proposal in all its complexity the same as the Senate and 
House understand it? 
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Still, my pessimism does not dampen my enthusiasm for this brilliant book. No one interested in the 
interpretation of legal texts can afford not to read it. 
Lawrence A. Alexander, Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. 
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